China's soft power and growing influence in Southeast Asia by Hwang, Edward F.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-03
China's soft power and growing influence in
Southeast Asia
Hwang, Edward F.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 









 Thesis Advisor:   Alice Lyman Miller 
   Second Reader: Robert Looney 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  China’s Soft Power and Growing Influence in 
Southeast Asia 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Captain Edward F. Hwang 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
  
The term “soft power” was coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. of Harvard.  The definition of soft power has 
expanded over the years and continues to grow.  In most contexts, the United States is the focus of debate over its use 
of or lack of soft power and the appropriateness and positive or negative effects generated.  In more recent times, 
China has had a diplomatic makeover and has begun utilizing its soft power capabilities.  By no means is China able 
to surpass the United States soft power capabilities.  As China’s economy and influence in the region continue to 
grow however, China as an alternative to the United States can become a reality.      
This thesis’s focuses on China’s soft power in its relations with its Southeastern neighbors (Myanmar, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos) and takes as a case study its impact on China’s development plans for the 
Lacang-Mekong River.  I determine how the utilization of soft power tools allows China to pursue its development 
plans with minimal interference from the other five riparian countries.  The thesis is in four sections.  They assess a) 
what is soft power and its tools; b) how China applies its soft power on its Southeastern neighbors; c) how this affects 
China’s efforts to participate in development of the Lacang-Mekong River; and d) what the implications are for the 
United States?         
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
87 
14. SUBJECT TERMS China, Soft Power, Southeast Asia  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
CHINA’S SOFT POWER AND GROWING INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
 
Edward F. Hwang 
Captain, United States Air Force 
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Harold A. Trinkunas 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
The term “soft power” was coined by Joseph S. Nye Jr. of Harvard.  The 
definition of soft power has expanded over the years and continues to grow.  In most 
contexts, the United States is the focus of debate over its use of or lack of soft power and 
the appropriateness and positive or negative effects generated.  In more recent times, 
China has had a diplomatic makeover and has begun utilizing its soft power capabilities.  
By no means is China able to surpass the United States soft power capabilities.  As 
China’s economy and influence in the region continue to grow however, China as an 
alternative to the United States can become a reality.      
This thesis’s focuses on China’s soft power in its relations with its Southeastern 
neighbors (Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos) and takes as a case study 
its impact on China’s development plans for the Lacang-Mekong River.  I determine how 
the utilization of soft power tools allows China to pursue its development plans with 
minimal interference from the other five riparian countries.  The thesis is in four sections.  
They assess a) what is soft power and its tools; b) how China applies its soft power on its 
Southeastern neighbors; c) how this affects China’s efforts to participate in development 
of the Lacang-Mekong River; and d) what the implications are for the United States?         
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A. PURPOSE    
This thesis explores the concept of soft power in the context of China’s rise and 
its growing influence in Southeast Asia.  It first briefly describes China’s ascendance in 
the world in terms of political and economic power and Southeast Asia’s perspective on 
China’s rise and its influence in Southeast Asia.  Finally, it addresses the importance of 
soft power and why China’s increasing influence in Southeast Asia must be considered in 
designing a comprehensive Southeast Asia policy for the United States.  
B. IMPORTANCE   
The post-Cold War world has turned out differently than Deng Xiaoping 
predicted. Deng’s viewed the bipolarity of the Cold War as a dangerous, unpredictable 
international environment due to the specter war between the superpowers.  Instead of an 
international environment characterized by multi-polarity in the post-Cold War, China 
faced an American dominated unipolar world.  Beijing views its continued, fast-paced 
economic development as its main course to engineer the country’s rise as a great 
power.1  Beijing welcomes the peace and stability the United States brings to the region.  
As China becomes more confident it is determined to play the role that is expected of a 
country of its sheer size, economic, and political potential.  Like other regional powers, 
Beijing will want to shape and not be led by the international system.  My research of 
China’s soft power and its application in Southeast Asia assesses China’s growing 
influence and ambitions.  I use China’s development of the Lacang-Mekong River for 
hydropower as a case study to demonstrate China’s soft power in action.           
China’s rise in the international system has countries all around world concerned 
over its current and future intentions.  As China’s influence continues to expand in terms 
of military, economic and political power, countries are becoming more and more aware 
                                                 
1 Avery Goldstein. “The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging 
Choice,” The China Quarterly, no. 168 (December 2001): 836. 
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of Beijing’s importance.  China a developing country of 1.3 billion is now one of the 
world’s fastest growing economies.  China’s economy has averaged 9 percent growth in 
the past 15 years.2  In late 2005, China announced that its economy was 17 percent larger 
than previously estimated, with a growth rate of 9.9 percent.3  In 2006, China’s national 
economic output was estimated at US$2.26 trillion, making China the world’s fourth 
largest economy in market exchange rate terms.4  In purchasing power parity terms, 
China is the second largest economy behind the United States.5  Beijing’s military 
continues to modernize, and its budget enjoys double-digit growth.6  Chinese military 
experts expect the People’s Liberation Army to have the ability to project its forces 
“beyond China’s coastal periphery within 10 to 20 years.”7  Beijing is one of the few 
Leninist political systems to survive the Cold War.  With almost 22 years of isolation 
from the international arena, Beijing perceives itself and is perceived by others in the 
region as a rising power that is demanding its rightful seat among the regional powers, 
potentially becoming the next strategic competitor to the United States. 
Southeast Asia has a combined population of approximately 500 million over a 
total area of 4.5 million square kilometers.8  The region as whole has a combined gross 
domestic product of about US$ 700 billion and a total trade of about US$ 850 billion.9  
Throughout the Cold War, many Southeast Asian countries increased their living 
standards through free markets and foreign direct investments, especially from Japan and 
the United States.  Up until the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the majority of Southeast 
Asian states enjoyed strong economic growth.  As the region recovered from the financial 
                                                 
2 Marvine C. Ott, "Southeast Asia Security Challenges: America's Response?" Strategic Forum 222 
(October 2006), 5, http://www.ndu.edu/inss (accessed September 2007).  
3 Milton E. Osborne. “The Paramount Power: China and the Countries of Southeast Asia.” Lowy 
Institute for International Policy, no. 11 (2006): 6.    
4 Ibid., 6. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ott, 5. 
7 Ibid. 
8 “Overview Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (accessed October 2007). 
9 Ibid. 
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crisis, the Southeast Asian states have resumed their previous economic growth trend.  
However, as Beijing’s economy continues to grow, China has begun to compete with the 
Southeast Asian states for resources, foreign direct investment and Western markets.  
China’s growing influence and its potential economic, military and political power in the 
region have many Southeast nations concerned over China’s direction.   The major 
looming question is: Will China’s rise continue to be a peaceful?    
Geographically, Beijing shares land borders with three Southeast Asian states--
Burma, Laos and Vietnam.  In terms of maritime borders, China shares sea borders with 
nine of ten Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of Burma.  Geographic 
proximity makes Southeast Asia a prime area for China to exert its influence.   
Historically, Southeast Asia was a natural target for China to extend its sphere of 
influence.  According to one Chinese scholar, “Southeast Asia is China’s backyard” as 
American’s backyard consist of Latin America and South America.10  For centuries 
imperial China exerted its influence on the ancient Southeast Asian kingdoms and 
principalities through the tribute system.  During the early part of communist rule, Mao’s 
foreign policy toward his Southeast Asian neighbors was marked with periods of tension.  
Mao Zedong’s support for class-based revolutionary struggle in Southeast Asian region 
alienated Beijing from a number of Southeast Asian countries.  China supported various 
communist parties and insurgencies in several Southeast Asian states, either directly by 
providing aid and military support or indirectly through political support.   Deng 
Xiaoping’s accession to power in 1978 marked a change in policy to develop the nation’s 
economy through market reforms than class struggle.  Deng’s policies were based on the 
“four modernizations” (modernizing industry, agriculture, science and technology, and 
national defense).   
The 1990s were marked by China’s aggressive tendencies as well as convergence 
on many issues within Southeast Asia.  Beijing’s occupation of Mischief Reef, in the 
Spratlys, and its testing of a missile in reaction to Taiwan’s push toward independence 
worried many Southeast Asians about the direction China was heading in.  Would China 
                                                 
10 Osborne, 12.    
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become an aggressive hegemonic power in the region?  At the same time, China engaged 
ASEAN on numerous economic issues and pushed for a free trade area between China 
and ASEAN states. 
Although Beijing’s increasing influence in the region is seen as a natural 
progression, there is still concern that China’s rise will not be peaceful but be dangerous 
for the region.  As the United States loses its influence in the region due to its unpopular 
unilateral foreign policy, China is gaining from the decline.  Beijing’s “charm offensive” 
is producing results.  Opinion polls in the region and the world suggest that China’s rise 
is seen positively as offering benefits.  Politicians who were once vocal about Chinese 
hegemonic ambitions now praise the Chinese for the contributions to their local 
economies.  Although Chinese investments and aid are far below the United States, news 
of Chinese contributions are displayed prominently in local newspapers.  China’s 
influence is seen all around.  More and more goods are marked with “Made in China” 
labels.  China studies is the new fad and shows no sign of dissipating.  Confucius 
Institutes and Chinese culture schools are being established all over the globe.  Chinese 
diplomats are receiving more grandiose red carpet welcomes than any other country’s 
diplomats.  The French welcomed Hu Jintao with both the lighting of the Eiffel tower and 
the famed Champs-Elysees was the site of a 54-foot float led by the longest dragon in the 
world.11  It was the first time the French used two of their most esteem venues to honor a 
single state.12  Understanding China’s objectives and aspirations are pressing issues 
because of China’s potential future in the Asia-Pacific region.       
1. United States Interest in Southeast Asia 
United States interests in the Asia-Pacific region are as follows: 
• Peace and stability; 
• Commercial access to the region; 
                                                 
11 XiaoXiong Yi, “Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition: Understanding China’s Peaceful 
Development,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs XIX, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2005): 94. 
12 Ibid., 94. 
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• Freedom of navigation; and 
• The prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition; 
These U.S interests were set down in the “United States Security Strategy in the 
East-Asia Pacific Region” (1995) and they still hold true today.  Peace and stability are 
essential to maintaining continuous commercial access for the U.S. economy.  
Washington continues to pursue its economic goals of open markets and equal 
commercial access.  Washington has a permanent strategic interest in the ability to 
control the sea lanes from the Middle East to the Pacific Ocean.  Freedom of navigation 
allows U.S. goods and those of our allies to transport through the Strait of Malacca 
unimpeded.  It also allows the U.S. military to react quickly and unhindered in the region.  
Protection of U.S. security and economic interests affects the success of other global U.S. 
foreign policy priorities, such as the promotion of democracy, human rights, international 
terrorism and other transnational issues.  Southeast Asia has been labeled the “second 
front of the Global War on Terrorism,” re-focusing U.S. attention to the region.           
Washington does not want a rival power in the region.  Rising powers are viewed 
as destabilizing forces that can upset the peace and stability of the region.  China’s 
emergence as a rising regional power is viewed as a possible unsettling force the 
Washington and its allies must deal with.  If China’s rise is perceived as benign, the 
Washington welcomes China’s entrance.  However, if China’s entry is perceived as 
aggressive, then Washington will respond accordingly.  The United States must maintain 
its position in the region.  Without our continued presence, the United States would lose 
the leverage it has in the region.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Joseph Nye, the pioneering scholar on the concept of “soft power,” begins his 
book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (2004) with him sitting in the 
audience at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.  Having coined the term 
“soft power” a decade earlier in his book Bound to Lead (1990), he was pleasantly 
surprised when George Carey, former Archbishop of Canterbury, asked Secretary of 
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State Colin Powell why the United States was so focused on hard power and not on 
developing its soft power.  Later that year, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
was asked for his opinion on soft power, he responded “I don’t know what it means.”13  
This is the issue with soft power.  There are those that understand the meaning of soft 
power and there are those who do not.  There are those who presume they understand soft 
power but in fact do not.   
Generally speaking, most scholars separate hard power and soft power.  Hard 
power is often associated with military and economic strength.  Soft power on the other 
hand is a bit more difficult to define.  There are generally three trains of thoughts on soft 
power.  Nye defines it as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than 
coercion or payments,” and the sources of soft power are “the attractiveness of a 
country’s culture, political ideals and policies.”14  Nye separates military power, 
economic power, and soft power into three distinct categories.  He leaves no room for 
overlap between the three types of power.  Others such as Joshua Kurlantzick incorporate 
elements of economic power with soft power, combining the two under soft power.  “In 
the context of Asia today, both China and its neighbors enunciate a broader idea of soft 
power, the idea that soft power implies all elements outside of the security realm, 
including investment and aid.”15  The third camp generally dismisses or still questions 
the validity of the concept of soft power.     
Nye’s view of soft power argues economic power should not be included because 
it presents itself as a type of “carrot” or payment or as a sanction.  Economic power 
induces instead of attracting another country to do something.  On the other hand, as 
Joshua Kurlantzick argues components such as economic power can influence another 
state.  It is simply a harder form of influence.  The difference in opinion is rooted in the 
perspective of soft power that each side takes.   
                                                 
13 “Old Softie,” Financial Times, September 30, 2003, 17. 
14 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Colorado: Perseus Books 
Group, 2004), x. 
15 Kurlantzick, Joshua. “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,” Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, no. 47, June 2006, 1. 
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Nye’s camp defines soft power from the perspective of the United States and what 
it needs to do to ensure that United States’ soft power grows and remains strong.  The 
focus is on the producer of soft power and what the producer can do to ensure its soft 
power continues to grow.  Kurlantzick’s perspective also comes from the producer’s view 
of soft power but redefines it to fit China’s production of soft power.  However, scholars 
such as Bronson Percival and Brantly Womack argue that it is not the producer’s 
perspective but the receiver’s view of soft power that is essential.  To determine the 
effectiveness of soft power, an analysis must be made of what are considered as elements 
of soft power from the viewpoint of the receiver.  The receiver’s outlook may differ 
entirely from the producer’s point of view, therefore making the producer’s soft power 
objectives ineffective. 
1. Chinese Soft Power 
Experts consider the 1997 Asian financial crisis as the moment when Chinese soft 
power began to emerge.  While Western nations were slow to react to the crisis, Beijing’s 
timely decision not to devalue its currency was perceived as standing up for Asia.  
Beijing recognized the positive effects of using soft power.  Its previous exercise of hard 
power during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-1996 and Mischief Island incident only 
exemplified the setbacks with the use of hard power.  Instead of resorting to military 
action, China began to use a less confrontational approach to resolve its issues with 
ASEAN states.  In 2002, China signed a code of conduct over the disputed boundaries in 
the South China Sea.  Furthermore, China has secured an agreement to establish a China-
ASEAN Free Trade Area within a decade.  
Since 1997, Beijing’s rhetoric of a “win-win” foreign policy along with solid 
actions to backup its statements has increased China’s attractiveness.  Beijing claims that 
as China’s economy continues to grow, China will become a larger source of foreign 
direct investment.  
China’s growing economy allows China to become a larger player in foreign aid.  
China’s aid to the Philippines in 2003 was four times greater than U.S. aid.  China’s aid 
to Laos was three times greater than U.S. aid.  More important than the size of China’s 
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aid is the sophistication of China’s aid.  China has discretely associated its aid with policy 
goals.  Chinese funds are used to sponsor numerous foreign government officials for 
study programs in China. 
China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia is not in question.  It is natural that 
Beijing would look to expand its economic and political reach just as the United States 
subjugated Central and South American in the past.   
Overall, the literature on soft power is comprehensive.  All sides utilize 
substantive evidence to support their arguments.  Kurlantzick does a good job presenting 
his case to expand Nye’s traditional notion of soft power to include aspects of economic 
power such as investments, and aid.  However, neither arguments clearly define whether 
Beijing has accumulated enough soft power to have greater influence in Southeast Asia. 
Does Beijing posses the power to influence decisions in Southeast Asia?  Both use 
polling data and economic stats to prove their points.  Polling data are usually unavailable 
or inadequate from the perspective of Southeast Asia.  Economic statistics show trends 
but do not show how China’s economic power has increased Beijing’s influence in the 
area.  This thesis assesses China’s soft power and its effectiveness in Southeast Asia.  
The case study assesses whether Beijing’s attempt at accumulating soft power has indeed 
translated into influence among the Southeast Asian states.  It also suggests how U.S. 
foreign policy may adapt to the new changing environment to ensure its national interests 
are maintained as Chinese influence grows in the region.                               
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis examines China’s soft power in the context of its increasing influence 
in Southeast Asia.  It reassesses contending definitions of soft power and modifies them 
if necessary to fit the context of China’s growing economic and political influence in the 
region.  It determines the scope of China’s soft power and how effective it has been 
increasing Beijing’s influence.  The final chapter offers recommendations for U.S. 
foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. 
The primary sources for the thesis include scholarly literature, newspapers, and 
magazine articles on China’s activities in the international arena.  Additionally, the 
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Congressional Research Service reports, Department of State and Defense literature and 
other official studies have been incorporated when applicable.  Moreover, specialize 
literature from non-government agencies in the United States, Southeast Asia, Australia 
and Europe have been employed.   Finally, data and reports from the United Nations, 
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II. WHAT IS POWER? 
A. DEFINING POWER 
Power is difficult to define.  “Power is like the weather.  Everyone depends on it 
and talks about it, but few understand it.”16  Depending on whose perspective, power can 
take on a multiple meanings.  To some, the military is the essence of power.  The number 
of guns or planes a country possesses and its ability to effectively use the weaponry 
represents power.  Or a country’s ability to affect and control the international market is 
viewed as the embodiment of power.  The dictionary defines power as “the ability to get 
the outcomes one wants.”17  It also defines power as “having the capabilities to affect the 
behavior of others to make those things happen.”18  Together power is “the ability to 
influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants.”19  Throughout this 
thesis, power will be used in this general context.   
Generally, there are three ways to affect the behaviors of others.  They are 
coercion, inducement, and attraction.20  Coercion uses threats or “sticks” to produce a 
desired behavior of others.21  An example is the threat of military action to force another 
to behave in a most wanted manner.  The United States used its Navy to intercept and 
prevent the Soviet Union’s transport of missiles to Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  
The U.S. threat of military action prevented missiles being placed in its backyard.   
Inducement uses payments or “carrots” to produce a desired behavior.22  For 
example, an economically more powerful country can entice a less developed country to 
act in a manner beneficial to the former, especially if the less developed country’s 
                                                 
16 Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics 1. 
17 Ibid., 1. 
18 Ibid., 2. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 5. 
22 Ibid. 
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economy is failing and in need of capital or resources.  In 1991, the United States halted 
millions of dollars in aid to the Indonesian security forces after the massacre in Dili, the 
capital of East Timor.  The United States used the withdrawal of an inducement to enact a 
change in human rights violations by the Indonesian government.     
Lastly, attraction neither uses “threats” or “carrots” to produce the outcomes it 
wants.  Behaviors of others are affected because they want to emulate.  Other countries 
want to follow because another country’s values and prosperity are desired.  No threats or 
payments are used to influence, but an indirect method of influence produces the 
preferred results.  This is soft power.  Soft power is the ability to set the agenda and 
attract other countries to behave in a desired manner without the use of force or 
inducements.                           
Power can be viewed on a spectrum with “command” on one end, and with “co-
opt” on the other.23  To determine where a certain type of power lies on the spectrum, it 
must be placed within context.  Power can be defined as “to make others do what they 
would otherwise not do.”24  However, just because an individual commands and it is 
followed does not translate to power causing the reaction.   
Failure to recognize that power may rest on various bases, each with a 
varying scope, has confused and distorted the conception of power… 
In particular, it is of crucial importance to recognize that power may rest 
on various bases, differing not only from culture to culture, but also within 
a culture from one power structure to another… 
What is common to all power and influence relations is only effect on 
policy.  What is affected and on what basis are variables whose specific 
content in a given situation can be determined only inquiry into the actual 
practices of the actors in that situation… 
                                                 
23 Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 8. 
24 Ibid., 2. 
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Political analysis must be contextual, and take account of the power 
practices actually manifest in the concrete political situation.25 
Power in reference to behavior changes must be analyzed from a baseline.  A 
baseline of preferences must be established.  The change in behavior can be assessed 
against the baseline to determine if a set of actions is normal behavior or a behavior is 
caused by another’s action.  Power can change as the context changes.  Power in one 
scenario may not retain its form under a different scenario.   
B. POWER AS A RESOURCE 
Most politicians and ordinary citizens view power as a resource.  Power defined 
within this context “as the possession of capabilities or resources that can influence 
outcomes.”26  Power appears more “concrete, measurable, and predictable” as a 
resource.27  According to Max Weber’s definition of a state’s power, there are two 
necessary conditions to accomplish the task of dominating the use of violence within a 
defined territory.  These two items are coercion and capital.28  The state needs absolute 
control over coercion within a specified territory and access to a continuous flow of 
capital.  This translates to a strong military and an efficient bureaucracy.  Without the 
monopoly of force and abundance of capital, the state would lose its legitimacy and 
control over the populace within the defined area.29  Herman Schwartz agrees with this 
perspective in his article “The Rise of the Modern State from Street Gangs to Mafias.”  
He pinpoints a combination of “lawyers, guns, and money” which allows states to 
maximize consolidation of coercion and capital in order to create a strong state.30  
Lawyers, guns, and money are the tools a state utilizes to exert control over their territory 
                                                 
25 Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society (New Have: Yale University Press 
1950) 85. 
26 Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 3. 
27 Ibid., 3. 
28 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 17. 
29 Ibid., 8. 
30 Herman M. Schwartz, States versus Markets: The Emergence of a Global Economy, 2nd edition, 
(NY: St. Martin’s, 2000), 10. 
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and to subdue others to consolidate more territory.  If a state did not posses a balanced 
combination of the three, the state becomes weak.  It was the cooperation between the 
king, nobles, and merchants that made all this feasible in Europe.  The larger the military, 
population, and capital a state possesses, the more powerful it is viewed to be.    
Translating power into resources is useful, but defining the level of power based 
upon the amount of resources does not necessarily mean that a more resource endowed 
state will achieve its objectives with respect to a less resource endowed state.  There are 
several cases where the more resource rich country was unable to attain its goals.  For 
example, The United States during the Vietnam War was more resource dominant than its 
less capable adversary, North Vietnam.31  The United States had more capital, a large and 
efficient military, and was more technologically advanced than the North Vietnamese.  
However, the United States was unable to achieve its goals.  The French, like the United 
States were more resource endowed than their rival, the Vietnamese, and yet were unable 
to defeat the Vietnamese during the French Indochina War.   
C. CHANGING SOURCES OF POWER 
Time has shown there is a shift in importance on the type of resources that 
encompass power.  “In assessing international power today, factors such as technology, 
education, and economic growth are becoming more important, whereas geography, 
population, and raw materials are becoming less important.”32  Rosecrance argues that “it 
was cheaper to seize another state’s territory by force than to develop the sophisticated 
economic and trading apparatus needed to derive benefit from commercial exchange with 
it.”33  Sources of power are not static.34  Table 1 displays the different power resources 
that played critical roles in different periods.   More importantly, Table 1 shows the 
changing nature of power resources and how context determines which power resource is 
more important. 
                                                 
31 Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 3. 
32 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1990), 29. 
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Table 1.   Leading States and Major Power Resources, 1500s-1900s 
 
 Leading States and Major Power Resources, 1500s-1900s 
Period Leading State Major Resources 
Sixteenth Century Spain 
Gold bullion, colonial trade, 
mercenary armies, dynastic 
ties 
Seventeenth Century Netherlands Trade, capital markets, navy 
Eighteenth Century France Population, rural industry, public administration, army 
Nineteenth Century Britain 
Industry, political cohesion, 
finance and credit, navy, 
liberal norms, island 
location (easy to defend) 
Twentieth Century United States 
Economic scale, scientific 
and technical leadership, 
universalistic culture, 
military forces and 
alliances, liberal 
international regimes, hub 
of transnational 
communications 
Source: From Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
1990), p.34. 
  
D. THE COST OF USING MILITARY FORCE 
Military power is still relevant.  Advancement in science and technology has 
allowed the United States to surpass all other states as the world military superpower.  No 
country can match the United States’ ability integrate information technology with 
military strategy to provide precision weapons, real-time intelligence, broad surveillance 
of regional battlefields, and improved command and control.35  However, with 
advancement in military power the political and social cost of using military force must 
be calculated more meticulously than in previous eras.36   
                                                 
35 Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 18. 
36 Ibid. 
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Social changes within large democracies have increased the cost of using force.37  
Postindustrial societies do not like high casualties.  Within these large democracies, the 
emphasis placed on military glory and conquest is gone with the past.  Importance is 
placed upon increasing the welfare of the state, especially the welfare of its people.  
Unless the survival of the state is at stake, the use of force requires an intricate moral 
justification to maintain popular support.38  Countries that use military force are more 
pressed to justify the use of it to the international community or be labeled as a 
destabilizing force.  In 2003, the United States’ actions in Iraq were perceived as 
illegitimate due to the lack of authorization from the United Nations.  The Washington 
was viewed as a unilateralist and breaking international norms.  Some would argue large 
states have lost much of the lust to conquer.39  This does not negate the possibility of war.  
Postindustrial societies have shown their perseverance during the 1991 Gulf War and the 
2003 Iraq War in the face of rising casualty figures.40  War remains possible, but less 
likely.          
Growing global economic interdependence increases the cost of using force.  The 
more integrated a country is to the global economy, the more susceptible it is to the 
unpredictable effects of war.  The use of force must be considered with respect to the 
state’s economic objectives.  Economic objectives consist of increasing the welfare of the 
state and the citizens within its borders.  One aspect is investors’ confidence in the state’s 
economy.  War can bring with it a lack of investors’ confidence in stability of the state’s 
economy and the global economy.41  The decision to use force can lead to a mass 
withdrawal of capital from essential sectors that would hinder economic growth not only 
with the state in question but with the world.   
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41 Ibid., 20. 
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III. WHAT IS SOFT POWER? 
A. POWER 
Power in its basic form can be broken into two broad categories: hard power and 
soft power.  Both aim to achieve the same goal--to affect the behavior of others.42  The 
difference between the two is in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the 
resources.43  Nye presents this in a spectrum with command power on one end and co-
optive power on the other.  Command power is the ability to change what others do.44  
Hard power consists of “sticks” and “carrots.”  The “sticks” refer to as military power 
while “carrots” refer to economic power.  Hard power rest upon coercion or inducements.  
Co-optive power is the ability to shape what others want.45  It rest upon a state’s ability to 
manipulate the agenda of political choices in one’s favor and the attractiveness of one’s 
culture.46   Soft power is typically associated with the co-optive end of the spectrum, 
whereas hard power is usually associated with the command end.47  Nye does state the 
relationship is imperfect.  Sometimes resources typically viewed as hard power may 
become a form of attractiveness and vice versa.  For example, a nation’s command power 
may attract other states or be used to created institutions that will allow a state to set the 
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Figure 1.   Power. 
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Source: Before Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Colorado: 
Perseus Books Group, 2004), p.8. 
 
Soft power consists of a state’s ability to grab the attention of, attract, and 
persuade another state without the use of threats or payments.  This attractiveness is 
sometimes equated to a nation’s “brand.”49  Unlike economic and military power, soft 
power does not use “carrots” or “threats” to get others to change their position.  Soft 
power is often referred to as the “second face of power.”50  “A country may obtain the 
outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries admire its values, want to 
emulate its example, aspire to its level of prosperity and openness, and so want to follow 
it.”51  After World War II, the United States used the Marshall Plan to rebuild a stronger 
foundation for war torn Europe.  Over $13 U.S. billion was spent on technical and 
economic assistance in the recovery of Western Europe.  The Marshall Plan was 
America’s soft power.  Europeans were attracted to America and its generosity to rebuild 
Europe.  The United States was seen as the guardian of democracy and freedom.   
                                                 
49 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia,” Current History, Sept 2006, 5. 
50 Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 5. 
51 Ibid., 5. 
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Soft power is not only the ability to attract but also the capability to set the 
political agenda.  By shaping the political agenda, a state can shape the preferences of 
others.  “If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do 
what you do not want to do.”52  A state can manipulate the political choices available by 
making other preferences seem unrealistic.  Institutions, especially international 
institutions allow a state to create international rules and norms that legitimize actions.  
Both the British and the Americans created institutions to set international rules and 
norms that were consistent with their liberal and democratic nature.53  The International 
Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the United Nations are examples of 
institutions created to set international rules and norms based upon American values and 
norms.             
B. SOURCES OF SOFT POWER  
A state derives its soft power from three main resources: culture, political values, 
and foreign policies.   
Different aspects of a state’s culture produce different levels of attractiveness to 
other states.54  What is attractive in one country many not be attractive in another.  
“Culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society.”55  Generally, 
culture comes in two forms--high culture and popular culture.  High culture appeals to the 
elites of society in such areas as literature, art and education.56  Popular culture appeals to 
the general public.57   
Most would agree that high culture produces considerable soft power.58  Secretary 
of State Colin Powell said, “I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the 
                                                 
52 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 9. 
53 Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 10. 
54 Ibid., 11. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power,”1. 
57 Ibid., 1. 
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friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here.”59  Cultural contacts 
involve governmental and nongovernmental exchanges to include such areas of 
academic, scientific, theaters, museums and opera companies.  The millions of 
individuals who have studied in the United States return home with a better 
understanding and appreciation for American values and institutions.  Many of these 
individuals returned to their home countries to be a catalyst of change and contribute to 
achieving American policy objectives.   
Popular culture’s direct effect on producing soft power is a bit more controversial.  
Critics dismiss popular culture as crude commercialism and view it as mass entertainment 
versus providing information, and therefore as having little political effect.60  However, 
this is not the case.  Popular culture is all of the above and more.  Popular entertainment 
contains subliminal images and messages.  American popular entertainment contains 
such messages as sex, violence, and materialism.  However, it also portrays 
individualism, freedom, human rights, and democracy, to name a few.  The poet Carl 
Sandburg stated, “What, Hollywood’s more important than Harvard?  The answer is, not 
as clean as Harvard, but nevertheless, further reaching.”61  The content of movies and 
other forms of mass entertainment can reach more people and spread more ideas than 
forms of higher culture.                
A common mistake is to relate cultural resources of soft power as the behavioral 
aspect of soft power.62  Nye uses the example of how some see soft power as consisting 
of using Coke and Big Macs to attract people in the Islamic world to love the United 
States.63  This is not the case.  The focus should be on what values culture represents. 
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Does the culture promote values and interests that others share?  By expressing and 
supporting universal values that others desire, a state becomes more legitimate in the eyes 
of its audience.   
A government’s political values and foreign policies are another source of soft 
power.  Political values and foreign policies that appeal to universal beliefs will generate 
soft power.  Domestic or foreign polices that are viewed as “hypocritical, arrogant, 
indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interests 
can undermine soft power.”64  The United States decision to invade Iraq in 2003 is one of 
many decisions that have made the United States unpopular.  Only three decades ago, 
similar unpopular policies with respect to Vietnam brought American soft power to 
decline.          
Culture, political values, and foreign policies are the backbone of soft power.  
Nye does state that the spectrum relationship between behavior and resources are not set 
in stone.  There are cases where typical resources of hard power will produce 
attractiveness.  “A strong economy not only provides resources for sanctions and 
payments, but can also be a source of attractiveness.”65  China’s strong economy is a 
source of its soft power.  China’s transition from a Marxist command economy to a 
socialist market economy with booming success has captured the attention of the world, 
especially developing countries.  China’s economy is increasingly seen as a source of 
economic opportunity and some view it as an economic model to be emulated.  More and 
more refer to China’s economic model as the “Beijing Consensus.”  The Beijing 
Consensus is seen in opposition to the Washington Consensus.  Although Beijing itself 
does not refer to its economic model as the Beijing Consensus, many developing 
countries are turning to China since the Washington Consensus has failed them in the 
past.         
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C. INTERACTIVE NATURE OF SOFT POWER 
Aristotle claimed that rhetoric had three modes to consider--the character of the 
speaker, the frame of mind of the audience, and the quality of the argument.66  Of the 
three, Aristotle believed the character of the speaker was the most important.67  It is not 
the speaker’s own view of his or her own quality, but the audience’s perception of the 
speaker’s credibility.  It is the responsibility of the speaker to persuade the audience that 
his or her integrity is upright and moral.  If the audience identifies the speaker as a person 
who is reliable and good-willed, then attention, attractiveness, and persuasion are easier.   
The interactive nature of rhetoric between speaker and audience applies to soft 
power.  Soft power is an interactive relationship between the producer of soft power and 
the receiver of soft power.  Soft power is characterized by a state’s ability to “grab the 
attention, attract, and persuade” another state.68  Just as Aristotle believed persuasion to 
be the core of rhetoric, persuasion is the center of soft power.  A state’s credibility in the 
eyes of the receiver will determine how effective its soft power will be.  Soft power rest 
upon a state’s ability to co-opt people rather than coerce them.69  A state grabs the 
attention and attracts many states because other states are persuaded by it.  The state has 
shown itself to represent certain values and norms that others too want to follow.  That 
state has shown consistency between its culture, domestic, and foreign policies and the 
norms and values they represent.   
D. ADVANTAGES OF SOFT POWER 
If the capacity to punish exists, then why is soft power relevant?  First, resources 
are finite.70  If country A makes use of sanctions against country B, country A will have 
fewer resources to utilize in future scenarios.  Hard power consists of converting 
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resources to realizable power.  Whether it is military or economic power, both are finite 
and depend on the availability of resources and the state’s ability to convert those 
resources into realized military or economic power.   
Second, the use of coercion requires indefinite commitment.71  Force denies the 
autonomy of a state and the free pursuit of its interest.  Therefore, to maintain the denial, 
it not only requires more resources but commitment from the denier.  “A person might 
have enough muscle to push a ceiling beam into place, but no one is strong enough to 
hold it there indefinitely.”72  The timeframe from invasion and announcing victory in the 
2003 U.S.-led war against Iraq was approximately 3 weeks.  Reconstruction and 
regaining control over Iraq continues on to present day. 
Third, the use of coercion may alienate others.  If country A uses force against a 
country B, then country A’s action against country B may be perceived as a threat against 
all weaker powers.  If country A’s objective is to alienate others, then its actions are not a 
problem.  However, if this is not the case, country A must legitimize its actions against 
country B in the eyes of the international community.  A case in point, U.S. invasion of 
Iraq did not receive explicit approval from the international community.  Therefore its 
actions were not seen as legitimate by all.  Many felt U.S. action in the Middle East 
threatened the autonomy of others.                              
Soft power is less costly than hard power.  This does not preclude the use of 
resources, but it is always cheaper to persuade someone than to force someone onto the 
same direction.  A successful persuasion increases the likely chance persuasion will work 
in the future.  Common goals, values, and mutual respect between members ensure that 
the parties involved will perceive the situation from the same and therefore produce 
similar solutions.     
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E. DANGERS OF SOFT POWER 
Power, whether hard or soft, has benefits and disadvantages.  Too much of any 
form of power can create enemies.  Too much hard power can create resistance rather 
than submission.73  Too much soft power can create resentment and rage instead of 
attraction and persuasion.74  For example, members of the European nations have 
imposed informal quotas on imported American TV.75  A survey taken by the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project in April and May 2003 reported that over 60 percent of people 
from Britain, France, Germany, and Italy enjoyed American music, movies and 
television.76  The percentage points were usually much lower in response when asked 
whether the respondents thought it was good that American ideas and customs are 
spreading.   
Table 2.   Cultural Complex. 
Cultural Complex     
Percentage of Europeans who say… Britain France Germany Italy 
They like American music, movies and television 62% 65% 67% 69% 
It's good that American ideas and customs are spreading 33% 27% 24% 43% 
Source: After Josefe Joffe. “The Perils of Soft Power, Why America’s Cultural Influence Makes 
Enemies, too,” The New York Times, May 14, 2006, 15.  Based on surveys conducted by the Pew 
Global Attitudes Project in April and May 2003. 
  
Soft power can attract while enrage both the high and low of society.  Europe’s 
1960s student movements took its lead from the Berkeley free-speech movement of 
1964.77  The 1960s movements quickly turned anti-American.  The American free-speech 
movement was imitated and then turned against America.  In Berlin, more than a million 
visitors stood in line to view a 200-piece exhibit from the Museum of Modern Art in 
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2004.  The cultural elites criticized the exhibit.  The remarks ranged from America’s 
cultural inferiority to imperialist conspiracy to suppress European contributions to 
American modern art.78           
A balance must be struck.  Too much soft power can cause a backlash against the 
producer of it.  Initially, the receiver may view the influx of culture and values as 
positive.  However, overtime this attitude may change.     
F. CHINA’S SOFT POWER 
 Soft power is an interactive framework between the producer and recipient.  To 
view soft power from the perspective of either the recipient or the producer would not 
only be incomplete but lead to false perceptions of what composes soft power.  The 
American-centric definition of soft power places culture, domestic policies, and foreign 
policies as typically the resources for the producer.  However, the receiver may not agree.  
The receiver may find other resources more attractive than these three.  Nye states that 
the relationship between resources and type of power is not set in stone.  Resources that 
are usually not associated with soft power can become soft power resources.  For 
example, U.S. values that emphasize human rights and democracy may not register high 
on what attracts people to the United States in particular regions.  America’s prosperity 
and the benefits associated with it may ride higher than the values placed upon human 
rights and democracy and as a result should be emphasized as a resource to increase U.S. 
soft power in those regions.  Beijing’s soft power may bear some resemblance to U.S. 
soft power.  However, Beijing’s soft power is different than American soft power.  There 
are certain aspects of it that are more attractive than U.S. soft power.  Beijing’s soft 
power encompasses more than culture, domestic policy, and foreign policy.   
Beijing’s buildup of soft power is effective because it takes into account 
Southeast Asian interest.  Although, all ten Southeast Asian governments are separate 
entities having a range of political systems, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) is the mechanism used to express their interests and desires.  The original five 
members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) understood their 
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shared interest would be better served unity than standing through alone.79  Therefore, on 
8 August 1967, ASEAN was created.80  ASEAN expanded over the years, with Brunei 
joining on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 
1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999.81  The members of ASEAN rely on ASEAN as an 
organization to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in 
the region.82  ASEAN also seeks to promote regional peace and stability.83  ASEAN 
members have all adopted the following six principles: 
• Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial 
integrity, and national identity of all nations; 
• The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external 
interference, subversion or coercion; 
• Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; 
• Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful manner; 
• Renunciation of the threat of use of force; and 
• Effective cooperation among themselves. 
Beijing promotes its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as its guiding values  
in dealing with other states.  China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were 
established by Zhou Enlai, U Nu, and Nehru in the early 1950s in diplomacy with India 
and Burma.  The Five Principles are:  
• Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;  
• Mutual non-aggression; 
• Non-interference in each other's internal affairs 
• Equality and mutual benefit; and 
• Peaceful coexistence. 
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History has shown that Beijing’s rhetoric has followed the Five Principles but in 
action Beijing did not always follow the same line.  ASEAN members have always been 
skeptical of Beijing’s intentions in the region.  However, Beijing’s change in behavior in 
the last decade has changed Southeast Asian’s perception of China.  No longer is China 
seen as a menacing threat in the short and mid-term future.  China’s long term intentions 
still remain hazy, but the immediate fear of an aggressive China is no longer perceived by 
the majority of Southeast Asian governments.  Many contribute this change in perception 
to China’s growing soft power in the region.        
A side-by-side comparison of ASEAN’s Fundamental Principles and Beijing’s 
Five Principles of Coexistence gives a better perception of what interest are important to 
each party.   
Figure 2.   Side-by-Side Comparison of China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
and ASEAN’s Fundamental Principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation (TAC). 
 
China's Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence 
ASEAN’s Fundamental Principles 
contained in the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation 
Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity 
Mutual respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and 
national identity of all nations 
Mutual non-aggression Renunciation of the threat of force 
Non-interference in each other's internal 
affairs 
The right of every State to lead its national 
existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion 
Equality and mutual benefit Non-interference in the internal affairs of one 
another 
Peaceful coexistence Settlement of differences or disputes by 
peaceful manner 
  Effective cooperation among themselves 
Source: After “Overview Association of Southeast Asian Nations,” Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (accessed October 29, 2007). And “The Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence,” Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Houston, 
http://houston.china-consulate.org/eng/nv/t140964.htm (accessed November 1, 2007).  Chart by 
Edward F. Hwang. 
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In essence, the principles established for ASEAN and Beijing are very similar in content.  
Both Beijing and ASEAN members require mutual respect for sovereignty and territory 
within its borders; to give up the right to use force against each other; non-interference in 
each state’s internal affairs; peaceful coexistence through cooperation and other peaceful 
means.      
1. Soft Power from the Perspective of Southeast Asians  
 Leading Southeast Asian expert Bronson Percival compares China’s soft power to 
soup.  The author emphasizes that the components of the soup are more important than 
the soup itself.  The attractiveness of specific ingredients to specific segments of 
Southeast Asian societies is the key to understand Chinese soft power.  Percival argues 
that soft power is difficult to assess.  Therefore, determining the components of soft 
power will allow us to determine who the components affect and by what degree.  He 
makes clear that soft power is not set.  Its definition needs to be adjusted with the 
situation.  He warns against looking at soft power solely through an American lens.  The 
original American-centric definition of soft power derives its resources from a country’s 
culture, political ideals, and foreign policies.  Southeast Asian governments view the soft 
power soup as including but not limited to economic benefits, shared norms, cooperation 
on nontraditional issues, infatuation with the new China, the mutual benefits of tourism 
and education, diplomacy and style, and networking and reciprocal obligations within 
ethnic Chinese communities.  Unlike the American version of soft power, this version 
does not include the appeal of the “City on the Hill.”  American soft power values of 
democracy and human rights are not as important as the Southeast Asian awe with 
China’s pace of economic development and their leaders’ desires to retain their political 
hold on power through rapid, continued economic development. 
 Southeast Asian governments appreciate the attention Chinese officials to pay 
them in contrast to other regional powers.  American officials have been labeled as 
lecturers, whereas Chinese officials employ the language of cooperation and mutual 
benefit, which is soothing to the Southeast Asian governments since it reflects their 
language of the past several decades.   Southeast Asian governments uphold the 
Fundamental Principles outlined in 1964 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.  They find 
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reassurance and practical, mutual economic and security benefits in working with the 
Chinese.  Beijing’s courtship with its Southeast Asian neighbors and the perceived 
mutual benefits allow China to accumulate soft power capital.  Southeast Asian 
governments are more inclined to consider Chinese views when formulating national 
policies. 
2. Chinese Military Power  
Beijing’s military continues to modernize and enjoy double-digit budget 
growth.84  Foreign experts on Chinese military expect the People’s Liberation Army to 
have the ability to project forces “beyond China’s coastal periphery within 10 to 20 
years”.85  Beijing’s military may pose a threat in the far future but for the near and mid 
future; Chinese military is not much of a factor.   
The Chinese leadership decided its hard power was limited.86  Beijing’s past 
aggressive behavior only fueled the fears of a China threat.  China’s military lacks the 
capability to project its forces past its immediate periphery.  Beijing has recognized its 
military is no match for the United States military, especially after the United States 
spectacular and quick victory over Iraq and Afghanistan in the early 2000s.  More 
importantly, China received such negative attention from the international community for 
its aggressive behavior in the 1990s that Beijing realized its mistake of seizing reefs and 
use of force only caused more problems. 
All this changed approximately 15 years ago.  Although Southeast Asian perspectives 
still vary over the potential for China’s future aggressive tendencies, there is a trend toward 
accepting China’s intentions as benign.  Vietnam, due to its past experience with China’s 
aggressiveness, is probably the most skeptical of China’s stated benign intentions.  However, 
there is an overall conviction that China will not go to war with its Southeast neighbors.  This 
re-evaluation of the China threat comes from Beijing’s willingness to set aside general 
territorial disputes and the recent restraint Beijing has shown in dealing with issues pertaining 
to the South China Sea.  China has resolved most of its territorial disputes with its 
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neighbors, such as Russia.  With its Southeast neighbors, Beijing continues to negotiate 
China’s land boundary with Laos and boundaries with Vietnam.  Beijing has shown 
through rhetoric and examples of its intentions are benign. 
Beijing signed the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” 
on 4 November 2002 at the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh.87  China has built upon this 
agreement with a multilateral agreement with the Philippines and Vietnam to conduct 
joint surveys on oil and gas reserves in the disputed island chains.  Military contacts and 
exchanges between China and Southeast Asia have increased.  China has attended the 
annual “Cobra Gold” joint exercises in Thailand and Singapore since 2002; ASEAN was 
invited as an observer to one of its own military exercises in 2004.88  Beijing has given 
military aid to numerous Southeast Asian countries, such over $1 million in military 
assistance to the Philippines.   
Although, the Chinese military does not have the most advanced and capable 
force in the region, it is slowly growing in attractiveness as an alternative to the United 
States.  No doubt, it will be several decades before the United States military presence 
and aid are endanger of being evicted from the region.  However, China’s simple 
offerings can be used to diversify a state’s military aid and security apparatus and be a 
form of leverage to obtain more concessions from the United States in matters of 
security.    
3. Culture 
 President Hu Jintao announced during his address to a joint sitting of the 
Australian Parliament on October 24, 2003 that “Chinese culture belongs not only to the 
Chinese but also the whole world…We stand ready to step up cultural exchanges with the 
rest of the world in a joint promotion of cultural prosperity.”89  According to statistics 
from 2005, the Chinese Ministry of Education setup 32 Confucius Institutes in 23 
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countries to provide Chinese language and cultural resources.90  There are plans to set up 
approximately 100 cultural centers worldwide within 5 years.91     
Singaporean Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated that “Soft power is achieved 
only when other nations admire and want to emulate aspects of that nation’s 
civilization.”92  Foreign student enrollment of international students in China has 
increased three-fold to 110,884; more than three-fourths of the students majored in 
academic disciplines of general cultural concern (Chinese language, arts, history to name 
a few.).93  Over 75 percent of the international student body is from Asia with an 
increasing number of Southeast Asian enrollments.94  For example, students from 
Vietnam have increased six-fold in the past six years, and 2563 Indonesian students 
received visas, a 51 percent increase from 2003.95  HSK, the Chinese “TOEFL” test, has 
seen an annual increase in exam takers of about 40-50 percent in the last couple of 
years.96  
Beijing has a history of influencing its neighbors through the spreading of its 
culture.  During the Tang dynasty, Chinese civilization spread to its neighboring 
countries especially Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.  Beijing’s status as Asia’s traditional 
center of civilization allowed China to create an abundance reserve of soft power for 
contemporary use.     
 Although it is too early to determine if China has accumulated enough soft power 
to influence nations along its periphery, China’s attractiveness is increasing.  More and 
more countries are turning to Beijing as their source of Chinese culture and Mandarin as 
the language of choice instead of Taiwan.  Beijing’s simplified characters are being 
taught over Taiwan’s more traditional characters.  Students are learning from materials 
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formatted with Beijing’s perspective instead of Taiwan, contributing to the 
marginalization of Taiwan’s international presence.  The spread of Chinese culture is 
presenting Beijing as a kinder and gentler image.  Growth in enrollment by international 
students is a sign of China’s increasing role as the cultural magnet of Asia.  Official 
statistics show some 30 former international students from China now hold minister-level 
positions, more than 10 have served as ambassadors to China and over 30 have served as 
attaches in China.97  More than 120 are serving as senior faculty members at universities 
worldwide.  Former students schooled in a Beijing perspective will nurture a Chinese 
interest for future generations and open their minds to Chinese worldviews and interest. 
4. Foreign Policy 
Foreign policies, if seen as legitimate and having moral authority, can contribute 
to a country’s soft power.  Accumulation of enough soft power allows a country to 
position itself to manipulate agendas in a manner that “makes others fail to express some 
preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.”98  The Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997 marks a turning point in Beijing’s foreign policy.  Beijing’s past use of military 
force to achieve its strategic objectives was received with little or no fanfare.  Its 
occupation of one of the Spratly islands and multiple clashes in the South China Sea only 
supported this fact.  Foreign policy under Mao Zedong portrayed an image of an 
ideologically threatening China.99  
Beijing’s decision not to devalue the yuan, an action which would have created a 
domino effect of sending other currencies in the region plummeting, was viewed as China 
standing up for Asia.  This decision, coupled with Beijing’s generous but limited 
financial bailout of its neighbors, created an immense amount of goodwill for Beijing.  
The PRC leadership saw the light.  Beijing’s third and fourth generation of leaders have 
surprised the world with a plethora of “xinsiwei” (new thinking), utilizing a multifaceted 
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approach in achieving its objectives.100  These generation of leaders focused on image 
building and multilateralism as the core for its new foreign policy.   
Recognizing that the international community is concerned by the potential 
implications of China’s rise, senior party adviser Zheng Bijian announced Beijing’s 
policy of “peaceful rise” in the spring of 2003.101  According to Zheng, the peaceful rise 
of China has been occurring since 1978 and is projected to continue until the mid 21st 
century.102  The peaceful development policy is a counterweight against the prevalent 
“China threat” or “China collapse” theories in the West.  Its goal is to placate fears of a 
threatening China.  Economic success has enabled China to pursue a greater role on the 
international order.  Beijing portrays a message that its growing economy, political and 
military might will contribute to enhancing global security, promote peaceful trade, and 
address transitional challenges.103                               
a. Beijing Consensus 
Part of China’s attractiveness lays in its successful transition from a 
command economy to a market-led economy.  China lifted 200 million people out of 
poverty and was the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in 2005.104  It received 
more than $60 billion in investments.105  Beijing’s remarkable growth has attracted many 
developing nations to its doorsteps.  China’s trade with other nations grew on average 
eight times faster than overall world trade.106  China’s economic boom in the last several 
decades has created a China economic development model fan club from various 
countries throughout the world.  Former journalist Joshua Cooper Ramo coined the term 
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the “Beijing Consensus.”  It is an economic model that neither believes in uniform 
solutions nor favors “one big, shock-therapy leaps.”107  Instead, the model emphasizes 
development plans formed around a countries specific restraints and advantages.  The 
“Beijing Consensus” is often seen as the antithesis to the Washington Consensus.  Unlike 
Western economic development models, it does not link economic and financial aid to 
preconditions.  Good governance, democracy, transparency, and other issues dictators 
prefer not to deal with are not required.       
Beijing has never used the term officially, but it has become a favored 
term with the developing countries. Chinese officials advertise the benefits of following 
such a model.  “The Chinese government has also actively promoted its own brand of 
economic development and reform model to African countries, encouraging…African 
governments to fashion their economic systems after [China’s] own."108  Some believe if 
China continues to gain economic momentum, the “Beijing Consensus” will become 
favored over the Washington Consensus.  China’s economic miracle is shaking up 
previous thoughts on economic and political development models around the world.  
Developing countries are looking to China not only how to develop but how to maintain 
their independence and way of life in the international order.109  
b. Win-Win  
China’s greatest achievements in the last several decades are in the 
economic realm.  Beijing has emphasized its growing role as an engine of economic 
growth for the region.  China’s Ambassador to the United States, Yang Jiechi spoke to a 
group at the Asia Society in 2002, stating that “A rising tide lifts all boats.”110  The 
ambassador highlighted the important role China would play to bring prosperity into 
Southeast Asia as it continues to rise economically.  Dealing with China is not depicted 
as zero-sum.  Beijing has backed its claims with solid examples and actions.  From 1995 
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to 2002, China-ASEAN trade grew an average of 19 percent annually.111  In 2002, it 
reached a record of $54.8 billion; an increase of 31.8 percent from 2001.112  In 2003, 
trade between the two topped at $78 billion.113  Some Chinese officials claim it surpassed 
$100 billion in 2004.114  Table 1 and 2 indicate the rise in trade flow between China and 
the ASEAN countries over the past few years.  China’s combined imports from the 
ASEAN countries rose by 239.5 percent from 2000-2005. 
Japan is by far the largest aid donor to ASEAN countries.  In 2001, Japan 
provided 60 percent of the development assistance to the region.115  American companies 
have invested more than $40 billion in the region.116  China lags behind Japan and the 
United States as a source of investment and development assistance to Southeast Asia.  
However, China promotes the idea that it will become a major source of foreign direct 
investment to the region.117  Chinese officials often promise trade, investment, and 
tourism targets projected five or ten years down the line.118        
Small signs of fulfilling these promises are coming to light in Southeast 
Asia as China’s economy continues to grow furiously.  China has invested heavily in 
mining, natural gas, and logging throughout the region.  Development assistance is 
flowing freely to Laos, Burma, and Cambodia.  China’s aid to Asia has risen from $260 
million in 1993 to more than $1.5 billion U.S. dollars in 2004.119  China has committed 
$100 million in aid and investment to Burma.120  It is developing Indonesian natural gas  
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reserves, navigation projects on the Lacang-Mekong River, and more.  China’s aid to the 
Philippines was four times greater than U.S. aid and three times greater in Laos in 2003.  
See Figure 3 for more details. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Chinese Infrastructure Projects in Asia 
 
Source: From Phillip C. Saunders, China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools, (Washington, 






Table 3.   China’s Exports to ASEAN: Selected Years (billions of U.S. dollars and percent 
change) 
 
Source: From Bruce Vaughn and Wayne M. Morrison, "China-Southeast Asia Relations Trends, Issues, 
and Implications for the United States," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 











Table 4.   China’s Imports From ASEAN: ($ millions and % change) 
 
 
Source: From Bruce Vaughn and Wayne M. Morrison, "China-Southeast Asia Relations Trends, Issues, 
and Implications for the United States," Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32688.pdf;. 11-12.  World Trade Atlas, using official Chinese data. 
 
China was the first to negotiate a regional free trade agreement with 
ASEAN.  In November 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation, agreeing the FTA would be created within 10 
years.121  Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand will become 
the first members of the China-ASEAN FTA in 2010.122  Most tariffs between these 
ASEAN member countries and China would begin to fall to 20 percent by 2005, 
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eventually falling to zero by 2010.123  Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia will 
become members in 2015.124  This agreement in completeness would create the largest 
trading bloc in the world with a combined population of 1.9 billion people and an 
economy of $3.0 trillion dollars.125  It is estimated by 2010, China’s exports to ASEAN 
will grow by 10.6 billion or 55.1 percent.126  ASEAN exports to China are expected to 
surpass 13 billion or 48 percent.127  The total trade volume is estimated at 1.2 trillion 
dollars.128 
Not only is the China-ASEAN FTA projected to economically increase the 
vitality of the individual countries, but China initiated an early harvest package to provide 
early benefits through tariff reductions on 573 products to allow disadvantaged countries 
to deal with the negative impacts of the agreements in a timely manner.129  The early 
harvest package is seen as a concession by China to share the benefits of the trade with 
everyone.  Southeast Asia as a whole maintains a trade surplus with China of $8 billion 
U.S. dollars annually.  Its enormous exports of raw material and prevision machinery 
allow the Chinese economy to continue with its growth.       
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IV. CASE STUDY 
This case study focuses on China’s strong self-interest in unilateral development 
of the Lacang-Mekong River in relation to China’s growing soft power in the region.  My 
research focuses solely on China’s unilateral dam building on the portion of the river that 
flows through Yunnan province as a potential source of hydropower.  The case study 
examines a) what China is doing; b) why it is doing what is does; c) whether Beijing has 
enough soft power to influence the behavior of the lower riparian states; and d) the extent 
to which Beijing has used its soft power to exert influence.  My hypothesis is that 
Beijing’s growing soft power in the region will allow it to exert more influence with the 
downstream riparian countries.   Beijing’s soft power will allow it to continue with its 
unilateral approach toward development of hydropower on the Lacang-Mekong River.  
Beijing will continue its development plans without consideration of the lower riparian 
states.  The case study focused on the five Southeast nations of Burma, Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam.  Due to their geographic proximity, China’s growing soft power 
in the region is most prevalent.  Within the context of dam building for the purpose of 
hydropower, my hypothesis of Beijing exerting unilateral behavior toward the lower 
riparian countries is valid.   
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Lacang-Mekong River is the eighth-largest river in the world.130  Its basin 
covers 800,000 square kilometers.131  The Mekong River runs through six countries – 
China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos PDR, Cambodia, and Vietnam (See Figure 4).  The 
Lacang-Mekong River originates in the Tibetan plateau, and flows from Yunnan province 
in southwest China through the remaining five riparian countries.  Approximately 73 
million agrarian people from more than 70 different ethnic minorities depend on the river 
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as their main source of livelihood.132  The population is expected to increase to 120 
million by 2025, but the resources will not increase accordingly.133 The river has been 
the center of multiple development projects to increase the economies of the countries it 
flows through. 
 
Figure 4.   Map of Lacang-Mekong River 
 
Source: From Presentation by Kevin Yuk-Shing Ki, Consultant, IRN China Program. “Lacang River’s 
Hydropower Plan and Power Grid Connection within China.” 
http://www.irn.org/pdf/lancang/KevinLi2005.pdf  (accessed September 2007). 
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Each of the developing countries desires to utilize the Lacang-Mekong River for a 
variety of purposes toward its respective economic development.  The Lacang-Mekong 
River has the potential to increase water for cropland, fisheries, electricity generation, 
improved shipping networks, and industrial use.  All projects are dependent upon the 
continued and steady flow of the river.  The Lacang-Mekong River originates in the 
Tibetan highlands of China.  Therefore the five countries are dependent upon China to 
maintain continuous flow of the river.  China has several options.  If China is moving 
toward a peaceful rise, development of the Mekong will benefit all countries associated 
with the Lacang-Mekong River.  If the opposite is true, China will continue development 
for the Lacang-Mekong while maximizing the benefits while the lower basin countries 
bear the brunt of China’s economic development.  The brunt may foster conflict 
situations over food security, economic security, and physical security.   
Although impact assessments show conflicting results, plenty of research is 
available on the implications of China’s hydropower development of the Lacang-Mekong 
River upon the lower riparian countries.  However, little research show the correlation 
between China’s growing soft power in Southeast Asia and progress toward Beijing’s 
perceived unilateral dam building plans.  Development of the Lacang-Mekong River has 
the potential for multilateral development toward building a prosperous economic region.  
However, both Beijing and Burma are non-signatories of “the 1995 Agreement” and non-
members of the Mekong River Commission (MRC).  The MRC is perceived as the 
primary multilateral organization to lead the development of the hydropower 
development for the river.  Burma’s absence may be viewed as non-threatening since it is 
usually seen as under the influence of China and only retains a small portion of the 
Lacang-Mekong River.  Burma lacks political and economic power to exert either soft or 
hard power in the region.  However, China’s non-member status worries many.  China is 
viewed as a political and economic superpower in the region.  Topped it off with its 
geographic, most northern upstream position and control over a large portion of water 
flow into the region worries many.  Other actions by Beijing, such as the vote against the 
1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
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Watercourses indicate a state focused on unilateral development plans for all 
international water sources originating within its borders to include the Lacang-Mekong 
River.         
B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT  
The Mekong Committee (the formal name is the Committee for the Coordination 
of the Comprehensive development of the Lower Mekong Basin) was created in 1957 
and sponsored by the United Nation’s regional office in Bangkok in conjunction with the 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).134  The Mekong Committee 
was designed to development the socio-economic standing of the four riparian states 
through coordinated hydro-power, irrigation, and flood control projects.  The Mekong 
Committee consisted of four of the six riparian states: Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and 
Vietnam.  Burma simply was not interested.  Communist China was not a member of the 
ECAFE in 1957 therefore not invited to the international planning effort.135  Most nations 
at the time recognized Taiwan as the legitimate government for all of China.  During this 
time, Maoist China focused on its internal political and economic development.  China 
was too busy implementing such initiatives as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution to pay much attention to the development of the Mekong during its infancy.     
Due to internal political conflict, contributions toward development from the 
Mekong Committee were limited between the years 1970-1974.136  The Pathet Lao took 
over the Laotian government in 1970, Prince Sihanouk’s regime was ousted in Cambodia, 
Vietnam’s conflict with the United States ensured that much of the Mekong River in 
Southeast Asia was off limits due to conflict.  Development was focused within 
Thailand’s borders and the Mekong flood plains of Laos.  It wasn’t until 1978 that 
Vietnam and Laos resumed participation in the Mekong Committee.  Cambodia rejoined 
in 1995.  The combination of conflict along the Mekong River and China’s wariness of 
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international organizations kept China at a distance.  China viewed international 
development organizations as Western mechanisms to impose their will upon developing 
countries.  China’s memory of its “hundred years of humiliation” under Western 
imperialism created a sense of insecurity within China.  China was very wary of foreign 
states intentions in China after experiencing the humiliation from the West in the 
1800s.137 
China began participation international organizations in the early 1990s.  In 1992, 
China became a member of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).  The Asian 
Development Bank created GMS to encourage coordination of trade and investment 
amongst the six riparian states.  This is the only regional forum in which all six states are 
involved.  China and Myanmar participate only as dialogue partners within the Mekong 
River Commission.          
In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s implementation of market based economic 
reforms skyrocketed China’s economic growth.  However, the economic boom was 
focused in several economic zones along China’s eastern coastline.  China’s western 
development was largely ignored for the most part until China’s western development 
campaign in 1999.138  Prior to the western development policy, initial surveys for 
hydropower, irrigation, and flood management projects were conducted a various times.  
The Manwan Dam began operations in 1993 and the Dachaoshan dam in 2005.  With the 
announcement of China’s western development campaign, there has been a flurry of 
activities along the upper reaches of the Lacang-Mekong River.   
What worries most Southeast Asian states is China’s continued reluctance to sign 
agreements to cooperate on development of the Lacang-Mekong River and continuation 
of its unilateral projects.139  China is planning for six more dams, with a combined 
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energy production of 20 million kilowatts.140  China’s continued economic success is 
dependent on a continuous supply of energy.  The hydropower development plan for the 
Lacang-Mekong River is part of China’s plan to provide cheap, clean energy for its 
economic boom.  China plans on doubling the amount of hydropower the nation produces 
by 2010.141   
There are few signs of a cooperative China.  In November 2002, China signed an 
agreement to provide hydrological data on a daily basis on water levels in the upper 
Lacang River to assist the lower riparian states with early flood warnings.   On April 20, 
2000, at the Golden Triangle Hotel in Tachilek, Shan State (East) Myanmar, the 
Quadripartite Agreement on Commercial Navigation Lacang-Mekong became the first 
and only treaty relating to the Mekong River China is a party to.142  The treaty allows 
free navigation from Jinghong, China to Luang Prabang, Laos for China, Myanmar, Laos, 
and Thailand.143  These are exceptions.    
C. WHAT IS CHINA DOING? 
Unlike other major rivers comparable in size, the Lacang-Mekong River is 
relatively untouched.  The first bridge over the Mekong River, situated between Thailand 
and Laos was only opened in 1994.144  The Lacang-Mekong River has the potential for 
44,000 megawatts of hydropower and yet less than 10 percent of this has been 
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harnessed.145  China plans on building a cascade of eight dams on their side of the 
Lacang-Mekong River.  Figure 5 shows China and Laos PDR as having the largest 
potential hydropower. 
 
Figure 5.   Potential Hydropower in the Greater Mekong Subregion 
  
Source: From Bakker, Karen.  “The Politics of Hydropower: Developing the Mekong.” Political 
Geography.  Vol. 18 (1999), p.214. 
 
Currently, two hydroelectric dams are complete and operational.  An additional two are 
under construction while the remaining four are in the planning phase.  These eight dams 
will be the focal point of China’s hydroelectricity production in this region.  Figure 6 
pinpoints the current and projected locations of the cascades of eight dams.  Figure 7 
gives the projected hydropower potential and projected completion dates.  The goal is to 
produce enough energy to be used in the area and to be sold back to the eastern coastline 
cities.  The eight dams are projected to produce 15,000 megawatts.146  China began 
operations at Manwan Dam in 1996 and Dachaoshan Dam in 2003.147  In 2004, work 
began on Nyoshadu dam.  The Chinese claim when complete, the Nyoshadu and Xiawan 
Dam will result in the “the potential of huge social, economic, and ecological benefits in 
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downstream countries.”148  The Xiawan Dam alone is predicted to regulate almost all the 
seasonal variation of water flow in an average year.149  Planning officials claim these 
benefits will include increased irrigation, flood control, navigation and dry-season power 
generation.   
     
Figure 6.   China’s Plans For Eight Dams Along the Lacang-Mekong River 
 
Source: From International Rivers homepage. http://www.irn.org/pdf/lancang/LancangFactsheet2002.pdf 
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Figure 7.   Status of Lancang-Mekong Dam Cascade Scheme 
 
Source: From “China’s Upper Mekong Dams Endanger Millions Downstream.” International Rivers 
Network.  Briefing Paper 3. (October 2002) http://www.irn.org/pdf/lancang/LancangFactsheet2002.pdf  
(accessed May 25, 2007). 
 
A 1993 joint venture with members from China, Burma, Laos and Thailand 
resulted in the Commercial Navigation Agreement of 2000.150  Several clearings have 
begun to clear more than 100 shoals and reefs between the Chinese river ports of Simao 
in southern Yunnan and the Luang Prabrang in Laos.151  Prior to the signing, navigation 
was limited by the presence of rapids and reefs, especially the low tide during the dry 
season.  Due to the clearings, vessels of up to 150 tons can now traverse throughout the 
year.152  There are hopes to increase the capacity to 500 tons to allow transport between 
Kuang Prabang and to Vientiane.153    
Through various organizations such as the Asian Development Bank, China is 
taking part in the Greater Mekong Subregion initiative.  This initiative is to build closer 
ties between the six countries through economic initiatives.  These include connecting a 
region wide telecommunication grid, energy grid, road networks and bridges.  All 
projects are geared to interconnect the six countries and to enhance the economic 
development of the region.   
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D. DRIVING FORCE  
China’s development of the Greater Mekong Subregion is driven by its domestic 
and foreign policy.  Although, China’s early economic reforms established a booming 
economy focused on the eastern coastline; it has left inner and western China wanting a 
taste of economic success.  As a result, China has experienced an internal migration from 
west to east in search of higher wages.  China hopes to dissipate this trend with their 
“Great Western Development Strategy” or better known as their “Go West” policy.  The 
“Go West” policy was implemented in January 2000 to develop inner and western 
China.154  In January 2000, the "Xibu Da Kaifa", or the "Great Western Development 
Strategy", covered six provinces, three autonomous regions and one municipality, 
namely: Gansu Province, Qinghai Province, Shaanxi Province, Sichuan Province, 
Guizhou Province, Yunnan Province, the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, the Xizang (Tibet) Autonomous Region, and 
Chongqing Municipality.155  Two months later it was expanded to include Guangzi 
Zhuang and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions.156  Yunnan province is one of the 
original six provinces designated for development.  The province is landlocked and 
straddles the countries of Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam; therefore the development of the 
Lacang-Mekong River is considered the gateway for its economic development.  The 
central government is building new infrastructure and providing incentives to encourage  
Chinese and foreign entrepreneurs and investors to develop the area. 
Deng Xiao Ping’s economic reforms have given rise to a fast paced growing 
economy.  China ranked second in purchasing power parity in 2004.157  China is one of 
the world’s largest economies with a GDP growth rate of 9.1%.158  China is projected to 
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continue on its fast growth rate therefore will require more energy to sustain it.  
Beginning in 1994, China began importing oil.159  If China continues it current trend 
along with inefficient use of energy, the International Energy Agency projects China’s 
current oil demand for 6.37 million barrels per day will increase to 14 million barrels per 
day by 2030.160  By 2030, China oil dependency will require approximately 75 percent of 
its oil supply to be imported.161  Not to mention China has the largest population among 
all developing countries and in the world.        
In respect to China’s foreign policy, China views development of the Lacang-
Mekong region as a key instrument to increase their bonds with ASEAN.  Even though 
only five of the 10 members are directly affected by the development in this particular 
region, China views cooperation in this juncture as a stepping stone to closer ties with 
ASEAN.  Increasing its relationship with ASEAN serves to counterbalance United States 
influence in the region and to minimize United States possible containment strategy of 
China.       
E. LOWER RIPARIAN STATES WORRIES 
China’s reluctance to consult and coordinate their plans for the Lacang-Mekong 
River worries the lower riparian states.  As each of China’s dams comes online, there will 
be less water downstream.  Each of the countries has its own concerns.  Laos has its own 
plans for hydroelectric production.162  Laos hopes to sell the electricity to their neighbors.  
Thailand plans for dam production of hydroelectricity and irrigation.163  Cambodia is 
concerned over its fisheries in Tonle Sap.  Cambodians believe the dams on the upper 
portion of the Lacang-Mekong River effect the migration of the fish in Tonle Sap.164  
Vietnam is concerned its rice paddies in the Mekong River are not receiving the 
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necessary silt maintain fertile grounds.165  The lack of fresh water also contributes to the 
increase saliently of the Mekong Delta because of its proximity to ocean.166 
F. MULTILATERAL GROUPS  
There are two primary multilateral organizations setup to deal with water resource 
management.  The Mekong River Commission and the Greater Mekong Subregion are 
the most prominent and are there to increase cooperation between the member states.  
However, none are bond by the organization’s rulings.     
1. Mekong River Commission  
The Mekong River Commission was established in 1995 between the 
governments of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam.  With a vision for potential 
benefits from joint management of the water resources and development of the Lacang-
Mekong River, the Agreement on the Cooperation for the sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River Basin was signed on 5 April 1995 with the goal “to cooperate in all fields 
of sustainable development, utilization, management and conversation of the water and 
related resources of the Mekong River Basin.”167  The Mekong River Commission 
coordinates joint basin wide planning through participation from the National Mekong 
committees in each state.  Under the Mekong River Commission’s Mekong Programme 
for the Sustainable Development of Water and Related resources involves it with 
fisheries management, promotion of safe navigation, irrigated agriculture, watershed 
management, environment monitoring, flood management and exploring hydropower 
options.   
China and Burma became dialogue partners in 1996.  Both states show no signs of 
wanting to become full members of the Mekong River Commission.  Often their non-
membership status is viewed as an example of Chinese unilateral behavior towards the 
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lower Mekong River Basin.  China’s non-signatory of the 1995, “Agreement on the 
Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin;” vote against 
the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses; and dam development in the upper Mekong River without consultation of 
the lower riparian countries are all examples of Chinese unilateral action. 
2. Greater Mekong Subregion  
The Greater Mekong Subregion consists of China, Burma, Thailand, Lao PDR, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam.  In 1992, the countries of the Greater Mekong Subregion with 
the assistance of the Asian Development Bank have involved themselves in numerous 
projects geared toward the development of socio-economic cooperation through closer 
economic linkages.  As of June 2006, 26 Greater Mekong Subregion projects cost an 
estimated US$6.5 billion.168  These projects ranged from transport, energy, 
telecommunications, environment, human resource development, tourism, trade, private 
sector investment, and agriculture.  The difference between the Greater Mekong 
Subregion and the Mekong River Commission is that China is a member of the former 
and not the latter.  This allows China to exert influence on the lower riparian states.  
Beijing has positioned itself in a major multilateral organization to shape the agenda in 
the region.      
3. Other Regional Organizations 
Other organizations such as the ASEAN-Mekong Basin Development (AMBDC), 
the Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina (FCDI) and Economic 
Cooperation in Indochina and Burma (AFM-MITI) are a few organizations aimed at the 
development of the region.  Beijing plays a major role in some of the organizations 
mentioned above.  China is following agreed upon international practices, but China’s 
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growing economy and attractiveness will increase Beijing’s standing within the 
organization placing it in a position to create norms and values its own terms within the 
region.   
G. CHINA’S SOFT POWER  
Soft power is viewed in the context of “persuasion” and “agenda-setting.”  
Persuasion is difficult to evaluate.  Empirically, it is difficult to asses whether a particular 
action was due to China exerting soft power in the form of persuasion upon another state 
to act a certain way or another cause and effect relationship.  One attempt to measure soft 
power is through polling.  Public opinion can be revealed through polling, however 
availability of measurements are less available and reliable in Southeast Asia.169  Other 
attempts focus recommending policies to enhance a state’s soft power.  Most efforts 
revert back to U.S. public diplomacy programs of the cold war.  This try does very little 
explain Chinese soft power in Southeast Asia.170   
In this case study, I focus my attention on agenda-setting, another less spoken 
portion of soft power.  Agenda-setting is the ability to set the preferences of others.  In 
the past Beijing was wary of multilateral institutions, fearing its state sovereignty would 
be endangered.  Beijing is a non-signatory of the “the 1995 Agreement” and a non-
member of the MRC.  However, in the last decade, Beijing has strategically placed itself 
to exert its soft power in the form of “agenda-setting” in the economic development of 
the Mekong River Basin.  Table 5 shows Beijing as part of several other organizations 
such as the Greater Mekong Sub-region that play a major role in regional development, to 
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Table 5.   Regional Frameworks in the Mekong River Basin and its participants 
 
Source: From Kayo Onishi, “Hydropolitics of china and Downstream Countries in the Mekong River 
Basin,” http://www.mekongnet.org/images/b/b6/Onishi.pdf (accessed November 1, 2007).  
 
Beijing is growing as a major financial contributor to many of these organizations 
therefore is placing itself in a position to set the preferences of others through legitimized 
multilateral organizations.  Not only is china following agreed upon international 
practices, but China’s growing economy and attractiveness will increase Beijing’s 
standing within the organization placing it in a position to create norms and values its 
own terms within the region.    
H. CONCLUSION 
The research expanded my analytical framework beyond my focus of the 
hydropower development along the Lacang-Mekong River.  Analyzing China exerting its 




To successfully assess China’s growing soft power in the region, the analytical 
framework needs to expand to include much broader economic development issues in the 
region.  
Within the context of a new founded analytical framework, my new hypothesis 
will show Beijing exerts its soft power in the region to focus economic development in 
the region in their favor.  China’s growing soft power in the region is present by its 
positioning itself to set the agenda within these multilateral organizations to shape the 
system.  As China’s economy grows, it will continue to push the socio-economic 
development in the region in their favor while the lower riparian countries are forced to 









Beijing’s reaction to the Asian financial crisis of 1997 was truly a turning point 
for China.  China did not devalue the yuan while providing emergency funds and loans to 
its neighbors in need.  Beijing’s new benign image was a welcome sight.  Beijing’s 
efforts to assuage the fears of its neighbors with its more benign image appear to be 
working.  A 2005 British Broadcasting Corporation poll of average people in 22 nations 
on several continents overwhelming believed that China plays a more positive role in the 
world.171     
China’s economy is averaging an impressive growth rate of 8 percent in the last 
few years.  The general belief is that as China prospers, others will benefit too.  Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao in a 2004 speech stated China’s rise “will not come at the cost of 
any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor pose a threat to any 
other country.”172  Beijing’s rhetoric of a “win-win” foreign policy, along with solid 
actions to backup its statements, increases China’s attractiveness.  China-ASEAN trade 
has seen an impressive growth of 19 percent annually during 1995-2002; in 2002, it 
reached $54.8 billion.  Chinese official claim the China-ASEAN trade surpassed $100 
billion in 2004.  China claims as China’s economy continues to grow, China will become 
a larger source of foreign direct investment.  
 China’s growing economy allows China to become a larger player in the 
international system.  China’s aid to the Philippines in 2003 was four times greater than 
U.S. aid.  China’s aid to Laos was three times greater than U.S. aid.  More important than 
the size of China’s aid is the sophistication of China’s aid.  China has discretely 
associated its aid with policy goals.  Chinese funds are used to sponsor numerous 
government officials for study programs to China. 
China’s influence is seen all around. More and more goods are marked with 
“Made in China” labels.  China studies are the new fad and show no sign of dissipating.  
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Chinese Confucius and culture schools are establishing themselves all over the globe.  
Understanding Beijing’s objectives and aspirations are pressing issues because of its 
potential future in the Asia-Pacific region.    
A. SHARED U.S. AND CHINA INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
The U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region are as follows: 
• Peace and stability; 
• Commercial access to the region; 
• Freedom of navigation; and 
• The prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition. 
The United States is a Pacific country and will always have a vested interest in a 
stable and prosperous Asia-Pacific community.  The United States trades twice as much 
in volume with the Asia-Pacific than with Europe.  United States and Asia-Pacific trade 
is approximately $400 billion dollars and accounts for over 3 million jobs in the United 
States.173  The United States is the largest consumer market for Asia-Pacific goods.  
Open U.S. markets are continually viewed by the Asia-Pacific countries as critical to 
Asian economic well-being and future growth.  The United States absorbs 40 percent of 
China’s exports, 33 percent of Japan’s exports, and 20 percent of South Korea, Taiwan, 
and the countries of ASEAN exports.174  In 2002, American trade with the Asia-Pacific 
countries exceeded trade between China and ASEAN by twice as much.175  America’s 
presence in the region ensures a seat at the table of Asian affairs to guarantee free flow of 
trade and to respond quickly to protect out interests. 
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China’s Current Strategic Goals: 
 
• Maintain a stable environment on its periphery; 
• Encourage economic ties that contribute to China’s economic 
modernization and thus to regime stability; 
• Further isolate Taiwan and block moves toward its de jure independence; 
• Convince others that China is not a threat; 
• Increase China’s influence in East Asia, in part to prevent “containment” 
of China in the future; and 
• In Southeast Asia, secure recognition as the most influential external 
Asian power. 
The United States and China share multiple interests in Southeast Asia.  Although 
in the past, the United States has not given the attention Southeast Asia deserves, times 
are changing.  With the labeling of Southeast Asia as the second front for the war on 
terrorism and China’s increasing influence into the region, the United States must 
refocus.  Southeast Asia has an approximate population of 500 million and contains vast 
amounts of natural resources.  It is the crossroads between East Asia to the Middle East 
and the Indian subcontinent.  Most oil imports for key U.S. allies in the Pacific transit the 
straits and sea lanes of communication of Southeast Asia.  The United States and China 
want to ensure economic stability and prosperity in the region.  The United States trade 
with Southeast Asia was more than $136 billion in 2004 while China was a little less than 
$100 billion.176  Although there is an increasing trend of trade between China and 
ASEAN, the figures show the United States is still the largest market for Southeast Asian 
goods.      
B. IMPLICATIONS      
China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia may prove to be good for the region 
and more importantly for U.S. interest.  If China takes steps the U.S. desires, then 
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Washington will have no qualms with Beijing’s rising status.  China’s determination to 
be viewed as a benign rising regional power has China racing to take new steps not 
associated with traditional hard power.  China’s participation in various regional 
organizations may prove to be beneficial in addressing nontraditional security issues and 
economic issues.  China’s push for a China-ASEAN free trade area is building the 
foundation for the region to think of itself as one economic bloc.  If the China-ASEAN 
free trade area is expanded to include Japan and Korea, the U.S. business community 
would look upon it approvingly.  These steps may be the stepping stones to bring unity to 
a region that is strife with historical memories and geographic barriers. 
China’s soft power could have the opposite effect and have disastrous effects.  
China’s model, also referred to as “Beijing Consensus,” is viewed as an alternative to the 
“Washington Consensus.”  In particular, authoritarian governments who are determined 
to stay in power prefer the “Beijing Consensus.”  Its emphasis on economic and financial 
aid without preconditions, give dictators free reign to ignore Washington’s desire to 
promote free democracies in the world.  Beijing’s support of authoritarian governments 
would stall democratization and better governance in these countries. 
Doing business with Beijing has resulted in the export of poor labor, political, and 
environmental policies.  Deforestation is an issue in Burma as trade increases with China.  
The Philippine government has been accused of providing no transparency on a $400 
million aid program for a major Northrail rail line.  Environmentalists are screaming of 
the lack of environmental assessments to determine the impact of the project.             
It will be some time before the Chinese military can pose a challenge to the U.S. 
presence in the Asia-Pacific Region.  The swift 2003 Iraq invasion can attest to U.S. 
supremacy in technology and the application of force during a war.  The Chinese lack the 
force projection capability needed to challenge the U.S. military.  The negative reactions 
from China’s application of force during the Taiwan Crisis of 1995-1996 and the 1995 
Mischief Reef incident are examples for why China is steering clear of hard power to 
achieve its objectives.   
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China’s soft power has shown a steady increase in the Asia-Pacific region and has 
proven to be useful in achieving its strategic objectives.  China’s good neighbor policies 
have diminished some fears of a rising China.  China’s influence in the area can be seen 
with the spreading and acceptance of Chinese culture.  Southeast Asians only a decade 
ago looked suspiciously to the north are now welcoming them with open arms.   
The U.S. unilateralist approach to the invasion of Iraq resulted in a less favorable 
environment toward U.S. foreign policy.  U.S. popularity in a vast number of countries 
has dropped drastically, where as China’s numbers continue upward.  The U.S. must shift 
focus and maintain their footage in Southeast Asia.  Japan is the foundation of U.S. 
foreign policy in Asia.  Both the U.S. and Japan hold key interest in ensuring peace and 
stability is maintained; sea-lanes are free to navigate; and to prevent a hegemonic power 
from rising.  It is too early to tell whether China’s rise will be benign or not.  However, 
the U.S. can take proactive steps with Japan to ensure China’s rise does not equate to 
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